ai · security · skills

AI Security & Safety

One seat. Two halves.Attack surface, and harm without an attacker.

Security is what you defend when someone pushes on the model or the agent. Safety is what you own when the system hurts people with no attacker in the loop. Same CSA spine. Different question.

Every harm has an ownerEU AI Act · High risk

Ethical requirements it triggers

Fairness & bias testingHuman oversightTransparency & explainabilityContestability

Control domains that hold the fix

Model SecurityData Security and Privacy Lifecycle ManagementGovernance, Risk and ComplianceHuman Resources

3 harm classes · 7 safety control families · NIST AI 100-1

Harm to People: Harms to individuals and groups — rights, safety, access. The class with the widest ethical-requirement pipeline.

The security half

What an attacker can do. What you own next.

Start with the OWASP Top 10 for LLM applications (mapped to CSA AICM domains — our judgment, not OWASP’s). Then walk the threats in plain English. The curriculum below is the AI Security Engineer’s primary control set.

Each risk maps to the CSA AI Controls Matrix (AICM) domains where the controls live. That pairing is our judgment, not OWASP’s.

  1. LLM01

    Prompt Injection

    Adversarial input that manipulates the model into ignoring its instructions or exposing data. The single most consequential class of LLM attacks today.

    Controls live in Model Security · Application & Interface Security

  2. LLM02

    Sensitive Information Disclosure

    Models leaking PII, secrets, or proprietary data through outputs — directly or via inference from prompts.

    Controls live in Data Security and Privacy Lifecycle Management · Model Security

  3. LLM03

    Supply Chain

    Risks from pre-trained models, datasets, and plugins sourced outside the org — the AI version of dependency risk.

    Controls live in Supply Chain Management, Transparency, and Accountability · Change Control and Configuration Management

  4. LLM04

    Data and Model Poisoning

    Compromised training/fine-tuning data or model artifacts that introduce bias, backdoors, or degraded performance.

    Controls live in Model Security · Data Security and Privacy Lifecycle Management

  5. LLM05

    Improper Output Handling

    Downstream systems trusting LLM output as code, SQL, shell, or URL without validation — classic injection patterns reborn.

    Controls live in Application & Interface Security · Model Security

  6. LLM06

    Excessive Agency

    Granting an LLM/agent tool access or permissions far beyond what its task requires. The cousin of over-privileged service accounts.

    Controls live in Identity & Access Management · Model Security

  7. LLM07

    System Prompt Leakage

    Internal system prompts becoming externally visible — leaking implementation logic and bypassing guardrails.

    Controls live in Model Security · Application & Interface Security

  8. LLM08

    Vector and Embedding Weaknesses

    Misuse of embeddings/vector stores: information leakage across tenants, embedding inversion attacks, retrieval poisoning.

    Controls live in Data Security and Privacy Lifecycle Management · Model Security

  9. LLM09

    Misinformation

    Plausible but false output presented as authoritative — hallucinations operationalized into systems of record.

    Controls live in Model Security · Governance, Risk and Compliance

  10. LLM10

    Unbounded Consumption

    Resource exhaustion, model denial-of-service, runaway cost. Where AI security meets FinOps.

    Controls live in Model Security · Threat & Vulnerability Management

See these risks in plain English on the threat map →

MITRE ATLAS shows up as technique cites on the threat map and on skills, not as a second scored crosswalk. We do not invent an ATLAS×AICM matrix here.

Your curriculum · 26 controls

5 skill groups on the CSA controls this role owns primarily: secure the model, attack it first, contain the agent, guard the runtime, defend the training data.

  • Secure the model

    8 controls

  • Attack it before they do

    5 controls

  • Contain the agent

    5 controls

  • Guard the runtime

    4 controls

  • Defend the training data

    4 controls

Skill self-check · nothing saved

Preview the prompts this seat owns, then score them on four concrete rungs. Self-assessed, nothing saved.

  1. Secure the training pipeline end to end. Could you secure a training pipeline so data, code, and checkpoints cannot be tampered with unseen, with a recent pipeline security review?
  2. Scan model artifacts before they deploy. Could you scan a model artifact for tampering, unsafe formats, and embedded threats before it reaches production, and keep the scan result with the release?
  3. Document models so others can trust them. Could you produce model documentation a reviewer can trust (purpose, limits, evals), with a recent model card or equivalent?
  4. Set what model documentation must contain. Could you define the documentation every model must ship with, with a recent documentation standard?
  5. Validate model documentation against reality. Could you validate model docs against actual behaviour, with a recent discrepancy finding and fix?

Run the scored mastery check →

The safety half

When the system does harm with no attacker.

Look up any AI harm and see who owns it, the controls that hold the fix, and the EU AI Act risk tier it lands at. Then learn the three skills the map keeps asking for.

The three skills this map keeps asking for

Evaluate how a model behaves

You tested code against a spec. A model has no spec, only behaviour: the skill is building the evaluation that catches what it does under pressure, before your users do.

Where evaluation gates the pipeline →

Fit a guardrail, and prove it

An off-the-shelf guard is a claim. The skill is refitting it to your own product and measuring what it catches before and after, on your data.

A real guard, refitted and measured →

Trace a harm to its owner

When the system hurts someone, who answers for it? The skill is reading a harm back to the accountable owner, the control that holds the fix, and the regulatory tier it lands at.

The harm map, below →

The harm classes · NIST AI 100-1

Three classes of harm, named the way regulators name them.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) AI Risk Management Framework groups AI harms into three top-level classes. We anchor the safety lens to those classes so the controls we fit map cleanly to ethical requirements, AI Controls Matrix (AICM) domains, and the EU AI Act risk tier each class typically lands at.

Harm to People

Harms experienced by individuals, groups, communities, or society — civil liberties, rights, physical and psychological safety, economic opportunity, equal access. Includes group harms (discrimination, exclusion) and societal harms (erosion of democratic processes, harm to vulnerable populations).

  • Discriminatory model output (group harm)
  • Manipulated content that targets a person psychologically
  • Denial of access to credit, housing, employment
  • Erosion of an information ecosystem (societal harm)
Fairness & bias testingHuman oversightTransparency & explainabilityContestability

Domains: Model Security · Data Security and Privacy Lifecycle Management · Governance, Risk and Compliance · Human Resources

EU AI Act tier: High risk

Harm to an Organization

Harms to an organization — operational disruption, reputational damage, security and financial loss — caused by AI systems behaving unexpectedly, leaking data, or being weaponised against the organization itself.

  • Brand and trust damage from an AI-driven incident
  • Data exfiltration through prompt injection
  • Operational disruption when an AI agent acts outside its mandate
  • Compliance failure traced to an unaccountable AI output
Human oversightTransparency & explainability

Domains: Model Security · Application & Interface Security · Logging and Monitoring · Identity & Access Management · Security Incident Management, E-Discovery, & Cloud Forensics

EU AI Act tier: Limited risk

Harm to an Ecosystem

Harms to the interconnected systems on which society depends — the global financial system, supply chains, critical infrastructure, the natural environment. Includes Environmental harm: AI training and inference are energy-intensive, and at scale they contribute to carbon and water footprint, e-waste, and resource depletion.

  • Critical-infrastructure disruption from chained AI agents
  • Environmental footprint of large-model training and inference
  • Supply-chain compromise via a poisoned upstream model
  • Systemic risk in a market when many actors use the same model
Human oversightTransparency & explainability

Domains: Supply Chain Management, Transparency, and Accountability · Business Continuity Management and Operational Resilience · Change Control and Configuration Management · Threat & Vulnerability Management

EU AI Act tier: High risk

Harm classEU AI Act tierPrimary requirements
Harm to PeopleHigh riskFairness & bias testing · Human oversight · Transparency & explainability · Contestability
Harm to an OrganizationLimited riskHuman oversight · Transparency & explainability
Harm to an EcosystemHigh riskHuman oversight · Transparency & explainability

The safety control spine

Seven families, harm-anchored.

A lens over the existing 18 AICM domains, not a new partition. Each family names where in the control stack a harm class is mitigated, the AICM domain its controls land in, and the standards hook a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) is asked to evidence.

01

Output & Decision Safety

Block harmful or unsafe model outputs — hate, violence, self-harm, CSAM, illegal advice, hallucinations in high-impact decisions.

Model Security
  • EU AI Act: Art. 5 (prohibited practices)
  • NIST AI RMF: MEASURE-2.6 / MEASURE-2.7
02

Bias & Fairness

Detect and mitigate discriminatory or skewed model behaviour against groups defined by protected attributes.

Model SecurityGovernance, Risk and Compliance
  • EU AI Act: Art. 10 (data governance)
  • NIST AI RMF: MEASURE-2.11
03

Transparency & Explainability

Make model behaviour legible to operators, users, and regulators — model cards, attribution, AI-interaction disclosure.

Governance, Risk and Compliance
  • EU AI Act: Art. 13 (transparency) · Art. 50 (AI disclosure)
  • NIST AI RMF: GOVERN-1.2 / MEASURE-2.8
04

Human Oversight & Contestability

Keep humans in the loop on high-impact decisions and give affected people a route to challenge an AI outcome.

Governance, Risk and Compliance
  • EU AI Act: Art. 14 (human oversight) · Art. 22-link (automated-decision rights)
  • NIST AI RMF: MANAGE-2.3
05

Agentic & Action Safety

Bound agent autonomy and tool scopes; gate irreversible actions; detect cascading or feedback-loop behaviour. The autonomy frontier — ties to the AI Cyber Maturity Model (AI-CMM) ladder (our model).

Model SecurityIdentity & Access Management
  • NIST AI RMF: MANAGE-2.4
  • OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025): LLM06 — Excessive Agency
06

Safety Evaluation & Benchmarking

Pre-deploy safety assurance — run a benchmark suite + harm-focused red-team and gate releases on the result.

Threat & Vulnerability ManagementModel Security
  • NIST AI RMF: MEASURE-2.5 / 2.7 / 2.9
07

Runtime Safety Monitoring

Detect harm over time — behavioural and safety drift, guardrail efficacy in production, harm-incident response.

Logging and MonitoringBusiness Continuity Management and Operational Resilience
  • NIST AI RMF: MANAGE-4.1

See also

The measured proof, the skills that power the fix, and where this sits on the maturity model each have their own home, so they are linked, not repeated:

Honesty & attribution

XL-SafetyBench by AIM Intelligence (with Microsoft, Korea AI Safety Institute, KT) — eval code Apache-2.0, dataset CC BY 4.0. Used with attribution. Guardian/RepBend licenses pending verification.

Harm-class taxonomy source — NIST AI Risk Management Framework 1.0 (NIST AI 100-1), 1.0 (January 2023).